Republic of the
Supreme Court
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Pedro Tagabi and |
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G.R. No. 144024 |
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Demetrio Tabaniag, |
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Petitioners, |
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Present: |
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PANGANIBAN,
CJ., Chairperson, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
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- versus - |
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CALLEJO,
SR. and |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
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Promulgated: |
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Margarito Tanque, |
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Respondent. |
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July
27, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to
set aside the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated April 17, 2000[1]
and June 16, 2000[2]
dismissing herein petitioners’ appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58697, and
denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
The facts, as found by the trial court
are as follows:
Plaintiff Margarito Tanque is the son of Anastasio Tanque
who, during his lifetime, owned and possessed a parcel of land with an area of
47,443 square meters, more or less, situated at Barangay Jolason, Tubungan,
The
same parcel of land was the subject of a civil case for recovery of ownership
filed sometime in 1968 by plaintiff against Genaro Tablatin, et al. docketed as
Civil Case No. 7551 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, which was decided
on
When
the lands in Tubungan,
Sometime in 1988, defendant Pedro Tagabi asserted ownership over a portion of Cadastral Lot 2104 with an area of 654 square meters, claiming that the same forms part of Cadastral Lot 2097 which is owned by him. Without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff, defendant Tagabi had the said portion entered into by his co-defendant, Demetrio Tabaniag, who planted the same with palay and corn.
Plaintiff then went to the Bureau of Lands and asked that Cadastral Lot 2104 be relocated to determine whether a portion was encroached upon by the defendant. Accordingly, relocation survey was made by Geodetic Engineer Ernesto Ciriaco in the presence of both plaintiff and defendants and, thereafter, a sketch, Exhibit “O”, was prepared and issued by the said Geodetic Engineer. It was found out that, indeed, a portion with an area of 654 square meters within lot 2104 was encroached upon by the defendants. The matter was then referred by plaintiff to the barangay officials concerned for conciliation. But no settlement was reached (Exhs. “P”; “P-1”). Hence, plaintiff filed the present action in court to recover possession of the disputed portion, plus damages.[3]
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
plaintiff the lawful owner of the property in question and ordering the
defendants to vacate and deliver possession of the same to plaintiff and to pay
plaintiff, jointly and severally, (1) the sum of P1,850.00 representing
the produce of the land annually from the time of filing of the complaint on
September 29, 1992 until possession is delivered to plaintiff; (2) the sum of P5,600.00
representing expenses for the relocation survey; (3) attorney’s fees in the sum
of P8,000.00; plus (4) costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court, defendants Pedro Tagabi and Demetrio Tabaniag (petitioners) filed an appeal with the CA.
On
Petitioners
filed their Comment on the Motion to Dismiss contending that the delay of one
day in the filing of their appellants’ brief does not automatically cause the
dismissal of the appeal. Petitioners
further contend that since there was no allegation of any prejudice on the part
of the appellee which may have been caused by the delay and since the issues
raised are substantial enough to merit consideration by the appellate court,
the liberal interpretation of the rules is justified. On the matter of lack of explanation why the
appellants’ brief was not filed personally with the CA, petitioners aver that
the practicability of the filing is self-explanatory considering that the law
office of their counsel is in Iloilo City while the CA is in Manila; and that
the court may take judicial notice of the distance between these two places
and, hence, the impracticability of personal filing.[6]
In his
Reply to petitioners’ Comment, respondent asserted that a correct
interpretation of the provisions of Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court
would show that it is mandatory on the part of the CA to dismiss an appeal if
any of the grounds provided therein exists; that even a delay of one day is a
sufficient ground for dismissing the appeal. Respondent claimed that the requirement of a
written explanation in cases where briefs and other pleadings are not filed or
served personally is mandatory, and non-compliance therewith will result in the
dismissal of an appeal. Respondent
brought to the appellate court’s attention the fact that petitioners’ Comment
on the Motion to Dismiss is not also accompanied by a written explanation why
it was not filed with the CA personally. This, respondent contends, is evidence of
petitioners’ deliberate violation of the Rules.[7]
On April
17, 2000, the CA issued the presently assailed Resolution whereby, in the
exercise of its judicial discretion, it admitted herein petitioners’ brief for
appellants despite having been filed one day late but granted respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss for failure to comply with Section 11, Rule 13[8]
of the Rules of Court and ordered that petitioners’ brief be expunged from the
records of the case.[9]
Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution issued on
Hence, the present petition raising the
sole issue, to wit:
The petitioners submit that when the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioners on the ground that there was no explanation why the said brief was filed by registered mail and not by personal service in strictest compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals acted not in accord with the said provisions and with the cited decision of the Supreme Court.[11]
Petitioners argue that the dismissal by the CA of
herein petitioners’ appeal on the ground of failure to strictly comply with the
provisions of Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court is not in accord with
the policy of liberal construction of the said Rules as provided in Section 6,
Rule 1 thereof. Petitioners submit that
a strict interpretation of the above-cited provisions of the Rules of Court
will obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice. Moreover, petitioners assert that the CA can
take judicial notice of the distance between the CA office in
In his Comment, respondent reiterates
his contention that the requirements provided under Section 11, Rule 13 of the
Rules of Court are mandatory. Moreover,
respondent contends that the said Rule does not provide for any exception that
would justify non-compliance therewith.
The Court finds the petition without
merit on technical and substantive grounds.
On
technical grounds, Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that
personal service of petitions and other pleadings is the general rule, while a
resort to other modes of service and filing is the exception.[12] Where recourse is made to the exception, a
written explanation why the service and the filing were not done
personally is indispensable, even when such explanation by its nature is
acceptable and manifest.[13] Where no explanation is offered to justify
the resort to other modes, the discretionary power of the court to expunge the
pleading becomes mandatory.[14] Thus, the CA did not err when it
granted respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and ordered that petitioners’ brief be
expunged from the records in view of the latter’s failure to present a written
explanation why they did not personally file their appeal brief with the CA.
Citing Kowloon
House/Willy Ng v. Court of Appeals,[15]
this Court reiterated the following pronouncements in United Pulp and Paper
Co., Inc. v. United Pulp and Paper Chapter-Federation of Free Workers:[16]
[R]ules of procedure exist for a
purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal construction would
be to defeat such purpose. Procedural
rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the
convenience of a party. Adjective law
ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and
speedy administration of justice. Rules
are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they help provide for a vital system of
justice where suitors may be heard in the correct form and manner, at the
prescribed time in a peaceful though adversarial confrontation before a judge
whose authority litigants acknowledge.
Public order and our system of justice are well served by a
conscientious observance of the rules of procedure, particularly by government
officials and agencies.[17]
Procedural rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a party’s substantive rights.[18] Like all
rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.[19]
In the present case, the CA
already extended to petitioners the benefit of a liberal construction of the
Rules of Court by not dismissing their appeal on the ground that their
appellants’ brief was belatedly filed by one day. What cannot be ignored,
however, are petitioners’ successive violations of the Rule requiring
explanation why they did not personally file their brief with the CA. The first
violation was committed when they filed their appellants’ brief and the second
violation was incurred when they filed their Comment on respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss. Petitioners cannot feign ignorance of such Rule because they are
represented by counsel. Moreover, they were already informed of such lapse
through the Motion to Dismiss filed by herein respondent.
In explaining the importance of
faithful compliance with procedural rules, this Court held in Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Natividad[20] that:
[P]rocedural rules are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined
to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, the Court allows a
relaxation in the application of the rules, there is no intention to forge a
weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal
interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases of
demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is
true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party litigants and
their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural
rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit
of justice.[21]
The right to appeal is a
statutory right and the party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with
the requirements of the Rules.[22] Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost,
more so, as in this case, where petitioners violated the same Rule not only
once but twice. The utter disregard of
the rules made by petitioners cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the
policy of liberal construction and substantial compliance.[23] Concomitant to a liberal application of the
rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality not only to explain and justify his failure to abide by the rules
but also to avoid committing the same mistake in the future. Hence,
petitioners’ repeated failure to comply with the provisions of Section 11, Rule
13 is enough basis to dismiss the present petition.
However, to write finis to the
present controversy, the Court shall dwell on the merits of the case in the
interest of substantial justice and in consonance with the time-honored
principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance
to argue their causes and defenses.[24]
Even on substantive grounds,
the Court still finds the present petition without merit.
The Court is not persuaded by
petitioners’ contention in their appeal brief filed with the CA that they are
not bound by the report filed by the court-appointed commissioner showing that
the questioned area of 654 square meters is inside Cadastral Lot 2104. The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate
from the trial court’s ruling, to wit:
As may be gleaned from the report
submitted by the Commissioner, the 654-square-meter-portion in dispute falls
within Cadastral Lot 2104 of the Cadastral Survey of Tubungan,
Defendants objected to the findings and
report of the Commissioner contending that the “resurvey should have been made
on the basis of the previous survey not on the Cadastral Survey”. (Written
Objection dated April 29, 1993, page 89, Records). Defendants’ objection is
woefully untenable.
Note that the Order dated
According to Geodetic Engineer Filomeno
Dano, both plaintiff and defendant Tagabi, were present during the relocation
survey and both were fully aware of and, in fact, agreed to the use by the
Commissioner of the cadastral records and the available data pertinent to the
cadastral survey of the two lots. In fact, both parties helped the Commissioner
and pointed to the disputed portion using the available cadastral records
relative to the two cadastral lots.
In any case, it is quite clear from the
text of the Order dated
Having agreed to abide by the results of
the relocation survey, defendants are now estopped from questioning the same.
In Bulacan vs. Torcino, the Supreme Court held:
“The Torcinos
try to impugn the results of the relocation survey. We agree with the appellee
that the appellants are now estopped on this issue because they themselves
prayed in the stipulation of facts that the findings of the geodetic engineer
would be the basis for the decision of the Court of First Instance. We see no error, much less any grave abuse of
discretion, in the lower court’s findings that the house of the Torcinos
encroached on the lot of Victoriano Bulacan” (134 SCRA 252; 259).
Defendants are thus bound by the results
of the relocation survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Filomeno Dano, Chief of
the Technical Services, DENR, Region VI,
Petitioners argue that the
commissioner’s report stating that the disputed property is within Cadastral
Lot 2104 is not enough since there is nothing in the said report which
categorically states that the subject property is not inside Cadastral Lot
2097. The Court finds this reasoning
specious. Since the contested property has been declared to be within Cadastral
Lot 2104, it necessarily follows that it is not within Cadastral Lot 2097. Thus, there is no longer any need to declare
that the same property is not located within Cadastral Lot 2097. Any statement
or declaration to that effect is superfluous.
The Court, likewise, does not agree with petitioners’
argument that it was erroneous for the lower court to consider their defense
that respondent’s title over Cadastral Lot 2104 was illegally obtained as a
collateral attack on the said title.
Settled is the rule that a certificate of title cannot be
subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified, or cancelled only in
a direct proceeding in accordance with law.[26] In Mallilin,
Jr. v. Castillo[27], the Court held that an
action is considered as an attack on a title when the object of the action or
proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to
which the title was decreed. The attack
is direct when the object of an action or proceeding
is to annul, or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement.[28] On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.[29] In the present case, the attack
on respondent’s title is definitely merely collateral as the relief being
sought by respondent in his action was recovery of ownership and
possession. Petitioners’ attack on the validity of respondent’s
certificate of title was merely raised as a defense in their Answer filed with
the trial court.
However, considering the undisputed fact that respondent
had been convicted by final and executory judgment of
the crime of falsification of public document used by him to support his
application for free patent[30] on which basis the
certificate of title was issued in his favor, it behooves the Court to modify
the trial court’s decision to the effect that its finding in Civil Case No.
20636 is without prejudice to the filing of the proper action for cancellation
or annulment of title in the proper court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. However, the Decision dated
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred in by Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. (now retired) and B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz (now retired), rollo, pp. 50-52.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp. 65-66.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Section 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing.
– Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other
papers shall be done personally. Except
with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must
be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule may
be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
[9] CA rollo, p. 88.
[10]
[11] Rollo, p. 14.
[12] Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc.,
G.R. No. 138137,
[13]
[14]
[15] G.R. No. 140024,
[16] G.R. No. 141117,
[17]
[18] Asian Spirit Airlines (Airline Employees Cooperative) v. Bautista, G.R. No. 164668, February 14, 2005, 451 SCRA 294, 300, citing Galang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76221, July 29, 1991, 199 SCRA 683, 689.
[19]
[20] G.R. No. 127198,
[21]
[22] Asian Spirit Airlines (Airline Employees Cooperative) v. Bautista, supra note 18, at 301.
[23] MC Engineering, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 412 Phil. 614, 625 (2001).
[24] Ańonuevo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152998, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 621, 626.
[25] Rollo,
pp. 46-47.
[26] Vda. de Mistica v. Naguiat, G.R. No. 137909, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 73, 82-83; Tan v. Philippine Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 137739, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 292, 299.
[27] 389 Phil. 153 (2000).
[28]
[29]
[30] Memorandum for the Respondent, rollo, pp. 97-98; Memorandum for Petitioners, rollo, p. 120.